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William Brown 
 
 
 
When introduced in 1999 the National Minimum Wage (NMW) was a massive and 
politically controversial intervention in the British labour market. By 2007 it had 
raised the pay of something approaching 10 per cent of the workforce by, on average, 
around 20 per cent more than would otherwise have been the case. The mechanism 
for its introduction was explicitly one of ‘social partnership’, conducted by means of 
the Low Pay Commission (LPC). Although it was designed to be at arm’s length from 
government, all the Commission’s major recommendations have been accepted. The 
minimum wage quickly won all-party support and became, in principle, politically 
uncontroversial.  
 
This study analyses the process whereby the Commission made its decisions. It does 
so in terms of the three main challenges that confronted the Commission.  These 
were: first, maintaining independence of government; second, making 
recommendations the government would accept; and third, achieving unanimity 
within the Commission itself. The study concludes with a discussion of what the 
process implies for the concept of  ‘social partnership’. The focus is deliberately 
narrow. Associated issues such as the determinants and impact of the minimum wage, 
and the broader role of the Commission, have been discussed elsewhere (Metcalf, 
1999; 2008; Brown, 2002; 2006). This paper draws in large part on the author’s diary 
notes written, as a commissioner, during the first ten years of the Low Pay 
Commission’s existence.  
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The Commission was established rapidly in the summer of 1997 as a relatively small 
body of nine people, three from a trade union background (including the then chief 
economist of the TUC), three from an employer background (including the then head 
of social affairs of the CBI), two academics as independents, and a Chair, who 
initially was another academic industrial relations specialist but whose successors 
came from the financial world. The Commission was to be backed by strong 
legislation, influenced by its own early advice, which determined issues such as the 
definitions relating to the minimum wage, the manner of its enforcement, and the 
choice of the then Inland Revenue as the proactive enforcer. But the Commission’s 
own terms of reference were minimal, beyond a requirement to make 
recommendations on the definition and level of the minimum wage while paying heed 
to various constraints. The government’s (usually annual) submissions of evidence to 
the Commission were factual and non-directive. How did the Commission manage 
this apparent comparative freedom? 
 
Three challenges 
The minimum wage was not an emergency measure introduced, as past incomes 
policies had been, to meet ‘a real and present crisis’. It was a presumed permanent 
tool of economic policy intended to mitigate a number of deepening problems 
developing from Britain’s increasing inequality of income. These included growing 
numbers of families and children in poverty, the escalating cost of combating that 
through social security support, and the consequential discouragements to move from 
welfare to work. The minimum wage had to be palatable both to the employers who 
would have to pay it directly, and to the wider society that might pay for it indirectly. 
To achieve this, it was important that it was fixed by a process that was both sensitive 
to economic circumstances and distanced from party politics.  
 
Whether or not the Commission was sensitive to economic circumstances would 
become evident with the passage of time. There were, however, three immediate 
challenges facing the Commission that, if not met, would jeopardise the acceptability 
and consequential effectiveness of the minimum wage. The first was that of reaching 
agreement among its own members. A divided Commission would weaken the 
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minimum wage by forcing the government to decide its level unilaterally. The second 
challenge was that of making recommendations that would be acceptable to 
government. Spurned advice would undermine the Commission’s economic authority 
and threaten to turn the minimum wage into a political pawn. The third challenge was 
to be independent of government. If the Commission were perceived to be otherwise, 
the interested parties would question the independence of its economic judgement, 
they would have less incentive to provide evidence, and enforcement would become 
more difficult. Let us consider these challenges in reverse order. 
 
i) Independence of government 
The speed with which the Commission was established and the associated legislation 
was drafted were important in giving it early independence. It helped to distance it 
from a Treasury that was necessarily jealous of economic control and anxious lest 
minimum wages might subvert a major government policy objective of reducing 
youth unemployment. Relations with the Treasury remained delicate for some years. 
Despite this, the only significant component of Commission advice that was rejected 
by the government in the first ten years was that the full adult minimum wage should 
apply from the age of 21, as opposed to the age of 22. Rejected for at least seven 
successive reports, this became in effect a symbol both of the government’s discretion 
over Commission advice, and of the Commission’s own independence. Apart from 
this, there were intermittent efforts by government ‘special advisers’ to get across 
particular preferences, by various routes. While these were not welcome, because they 
operated as perverse constraints on commissioners who were all determined to 
demonstrate their independence, they were largely neutralised by the process whereby 
the Commission made its decisions. Nor was the Commission simply reactive in 
avoiding party political influence. For example, during the General Election 
campaigns of 2001 and 2005, considerable thought was given to judging the timing 
and content of reports, to ensure that its work did not fall hostage to partisan claims. 
 
ii) Acceptability to government 
The second challenge was to produce recommendations that the government would 
accept. Here a great deal depended on the Commission’s research and consultation 
activity. Both Commission staff and Treasury officials had access to the standard 
survey data of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and New Earnings Survey (NES), but 
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the Commission had in addition the results of its consultative enquiries and, 
increasingly after the first couple of years, of the research it commissioned. Early on it 
became evident that the standard surveys were deeply flawed as measures of low pay 
– by 2005 the NES had been scrapped and replaced by a superior Annual Survey of 
Hours and Earnings (ASHE) – and the Treasury was understandably risk averse in its 
interpretation of them. The Commission obtained directly through its consultations 
useful if not statistically representative information from the low payers themselves. 
This included what relatively good employers found affordable and, more 
impressionistically, how they differed in management competence from poorer 
employers.  
 
Both the Treasury and the Low Pay Commission were initially acutely anxious about 
the potentially adverse consequences of the minimum wage on inflation and on 
employment. Some macro-economic models, including those raising anxieties during 
the 1997 General Election campaign, assumed that a general increase in wages at the 
bottom of the income distribution would have ‘knock on’ effects on incomes far 
beyond the low paid. Such assumptions generated dire predictions for both inflation 
and unemployment. In contrast with these, the Commission’s research suggested that 
the low-paid tended to work in small firms, or firms with flat hierarchies, and that 
both they and those working in close proximity with them were rarely members of 
trade unions. The implication was that ‘knock-on’ effects of the minimum wage 
further up the income distribution would be slight, and that the inflationary 
consequences would be slight as a result. An early meeting between the Commission 
and the equally youthful Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England allowed 
this prediction to be discussed where it mattered in terms of interest rate policy. The 
first NES survey findings after the introduction of the minimum wage in 1999 
provided reassuring confirmation. The initial inflationary impact of the minimum 
wage had indeed been slight, and the impact of subsequent increases would 
necessarily be far smaller. 
 
The possible adverse consequences of the minimum wage for unemployment quickly 
eclipsed all other concerns for both the Commission and the Treasury. There was 
intense anxiety about whether any signs of damage would emerge and, if so, how fast 
and where  - among young people? in retail? in Northern Ireland? among ethnic 
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minorities? Unemployment has never ceased to be the prime focus of concern. Two 
circumstances favoured the Commission in its efforts to carry the government with it, 
one fortuitous and the other intended. The fortuitous one was simply that, until 2008, 
the British economy was growing. Employment also continued to grow, and grew in 
those large sectors most affected by the minimum wage, notably retail and hospitality. 
Most importantly, employment in these sectors was growing as a share of total 
employment. Unemployment, which had been falling, levelled out and showed no 
signs of rising until 2006. Paradoxically, it appeared to be more of a problem among 
the 16 and 17 year-olds not initially covered by the minimum wage.  
 
The intended circumstance that won government acceptance was that the 
Commission’s ambitious commissioned research programme quickly brought to play 
the expertise of (among others) some outstanding academic labour market 
economists, the quality of whose work the Treasury specialists respected. Apart from 
a continuing programme of research ‘in-house’, the Commissioned funded over 
seventy substantial research projects over the period. Almost every adverse 
consequence of the minimum wage that was empirically accessible was investigated 
as rigorously as data permitted. Indeed, it is arguable that, in its defensive anxiety to 
be seen to be cautious, the Commission neglected to study the positive consequences 
of the minimum wage. As more data became available over the first five years and 
beyond, there was increasing evidence that the early employment effects had been 
benign (Metcalf, 2008). With the development of these authoritative research 
credentials, government confidence in the Commission’s judgement grew. 
 
iii) Reaching consensus 
The third challenge facing the Commission was that of reaching agreement among its 
own members. Two factors were critical here. The first was the external intra-
organisational pressures bearing upon the individual commissioners from their 
‘constituents’. The second was the quality of the bargaining relationship among the 
commissioners.  
 
Let us take the external pressures first. The commissioners were appointed as 
individuals, and not formally bound as delegates. But their professional esteem was 
necessarily closely attuned to the concerns and prejudices of their every-day work 
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colleagues. Especially in the early years they frequently appeared on platforms at 
trade union, trade association, academic and other events. Defending the decisions of 
the Commission could be a chastening experience. Most large trade unions, for 
example, were bound by conference policy to oppose any special ‘youth rate’. Some 
had committed themselves to mechanical formulae for the minimum wage of the ‘half 
male median earnings’ variety. Small businesses were often not happy with the 
bruising initial impact of the minimum wage, nor with subsequent rises. Any cosy 
consensuses formed by commissioners in Commission meetings came under threat as 
soon as they returned to their day jobs. 
 
There were some things that the Commission could do to protect its individual 
members from undue pressures from outside. One was to invite lobbying and 
argument to be focussed formally on the Commission as a body, rather than 
channelled through commissioners. To this end there was an annual process of 
seeking evidence, and of holding formal hearings with some of the more salient 
institutions giving such evidence. The Commission also conducted periodic postal 
surveys of individual low-paying employers, often in conjunction with their trade 
associations. This was less for the statistical data, because response rates were low, 
but for qualitative feed-back, and to be seen to be listening. Another important 
strategy was to fit in with pressure groups’ intra-organisational bargaining needs. For 
example, the Commission often took guidance from pressure groups in the choice of 
firms for regional site visits, which might result in commissioners meeting some of 
the pressure groups’ ‘awkward squad’ activists on their home ground.  
 
One of the Low Pay Commission’s most important tasks in reassuring external 
pressure groups was to give serious attention to the issue of enforcement. The great 
majority of employers affected by the minimum wage were in service industries – 
retail, hospitality, care homes, hairdressers, cleaners, and so on - usually with their 
competitors nearby. Often of greater concern for small employers than the level of the 
minimum wage was that competitors ‘down the road’ might be cheating on it. In 
response to this, the Commission had regular annual meetings with representatives of 
HM Revenue and Customs enforcement staff, at which monitoring and enforcement 
strategies were discussed. The Commission was sensitive to rumours of evasion that 
came to it. By 2007, despite the apparent energy of the Revenue staff, who were 
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carrying out around 5000 investigations a year which were resulting in around £3 
million of arrears being paid to wronged workers, the Commission was urging that 
some cases should be taken through to prosecution, pour encourager les autres (Low 
Pay Commission, 2007: 232). 
 
From the individual commissioners’ point of view, the most difficult external 
pressures to manage were on the issues on which their ‘constituents’ adopted set 
positions, by conference mandate or some comparably visible statement. Two of these 
were important: whether there should be a lesser ‘youth rate’; and what the level of 
the main minimum wage for the following year should be. Perhaps inevitably, these 
were the issues over which the Commission polarised; they threatened dead-lock 
between employers and unions. Early disagreement over the principle of the youth 
rate in 1997 and 1998 was the biggest obstacle the Commission had to confront but, 
that resolved, it ceased to be divisive. The technically messy issue of compensation 
for the enforcement of payment of statutory bank holidays briefly threatened a much 
paler version of deadlock in 2006, until it was agreed to side-line it as one of several 
exogenous factors encouraging prudence (Low Pay Commission, 2007: 254). 
Changing the actual level of the minimum wage, however, was always an issue of 
polarisation.  
Table 1 – Issues polarising the Low Pay Commission between employer and union 
backgrounds 
 
Issues that polarised the LPC Issues that did not polarise the LPC 
Level of NMW Definition of NMW (period, add-ons etc) 
Separate NMW for young people Offset for subsidised accommodation 
Treatment of statutory bank holidays Paid therapeutic work 
 Level of young people’s NMW 
 Tips 
 ‘Salary sacrifice’ tax breaks on crèches  
 Voluntary workers’ honoraria 
 Treatment of trainees and apprentices 
 Homeworkers 
 Piecework earnings 
 Agency workers 
 NMW for 16-17 year olds 
 
Beyond those, however, as Table 1 shows, there were numerous other matters, of 
which those listed were some of the more prominent, on which the commissioners did 
not adopt predictable positions. Discussion of these issues, some of which were 
technically and conceptually complex, actually took the bulk of the Commission’s 
 9
meeting time. Many of them recurred, sometimes in different guises. Some were 
difficult because the Commission was in no position to control the conditions under 
which exceptions to the minimum wage might be made. How could they make 
allowances for subsidised accommodation when they had no confidence in the 
enforcement of multiple-occupancy housing standards, or for training when the same 
applied to training standards?  On issues such as these, although the commissioners 
often initially disagreed, they did not polarise according to employer or union 
background. An outside observer would have found it hard to identify their 
underlying allegiance from the arguments they deployed. Indeed, on some issues, 
such as the treatment of employer-provided accommodation, several individual 
members changed ‘sides’ more than once in the light of changing evidence. 
 
Internal bargaining relationships 
The second factor affecting the capacity of the Commission to reach agreement was 
the quality of the bargaining relationship between the commissioners themselves. For 
these purposes we can define the quality of the bargaining relationship as the extent to 
which the negotiators are able to make each other aware of the constraints under 
which they operate and to make appropriate allowances. An improved bargaining 
relationship does not only mean a more efficient exchange of information. It also 
permits greater risk-taking. For example, individuals feel more able to ‘fly kites’ and 
engage in lateral thinking without being punished if those kites crash. It also permits 
easier adjustment of position, because the protagonists are more likely to be willing to 
protect each other by, for example, arranging small victories to mask concessions. 
This is important in terms of the external world, for instance in protecting individual 
bargainers’ backs from possible criticism of them from their ‘constituents’. But it is 
also important for bargainers themselves, in terms of protecting personal self-esteem 
and ‘face’ in the ongoing relationship between the bargaining opponents.  
 
Within the nine person Commission, maintaining a good bargaining relationship 
overall became important most clearly when employer and union members polarised 
over negotiating the next increase of the minimum wage. But it was also important 
more generally between all nine individual members. Their varied backgrounds gave 
rise to considerable diversity of personal sensitivities between, for example, large and 
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small employers, or private and public sector unions, or analytic and anecdotal forms 
of argument.  
 
The general feeling of commissioners was that, compared to other contexts they had 
worked in, the Commission was consistently characterised by a very good overall 
bargaining relationship. And this was despite substantial turnover - seventeen 
individuals occupied the nine commissioner slots over the first ten years, including 
three chairs. It facilitated a ‘problem solving’ approach to new issues. When argument 
polarised and serious negotiation took over, the good bargaining relationship also 
permitted a professional separation of the affective relations between commissioners 
as individuals, from the cut-and-thrust, ploys, hyperbole, and necessary rhetoric of the 
bargaining table. Once consensus was achieved on an issue, there were never 
significant incidents of residual acrimony between commissioners that might have 
affected its subsequent decision-making. 
 
Several features of the Commission’s work contributed to its preserving strong 
bargaining relationships. One was that the majority of commissioners were 
professional negotiators for whom moving to compromise from a defended position 
was bread-and-butter. Another was the amount of time commissioners spent with each 
other trying to understand the issues. From the start, the Commission decided to 
consult, in the field, employers and workers affected by the minimum wage, visiting 
each region each year for a day or so of site visits. Many of these were memorable; 
some were emotionally tough. Taking part in around four visits each year, working in 
different small combinations, commissioners built up a substantial network of shared 
insights and understandings.  
 
A less obvious reinforcement for strong internal bargaining relationships was the 
Commission’s heavy use of research. There were many issues on which 
commissioners’ initial positions were divergent, but for which obtaining some new 
facts, or arranging a visit, achieved consensus. Myths flourish in the world of work as 
much as in any other aspect of society, and can often be dispelled by relative simple 
enquiry. Research findings also provide perhaps the most acceptable ladder whereby 
negotiators can climb down from barricaded positions. Probably the most important 
instance of this for the Commission was the build-up of research on young people’s 
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pay - youth unemployment, sector choice, employment trajectories among other 
aspects - that eventually allowed a consensus to be reached on the initially intractable 
issue of recommending a lower minimum wage for young workers.  
 
Reaching agreement on increases in the minimum wage 
A good bargaining relationship among commissioners can do much to change 
confrontational arguments into co-operative problem solving. But, on the core issue of 
the level of the minimum wage, confrontation was unavoidable. The secretariat put 
considerable investment into narrowing the range of disagreement. Planning for the 
decisive minimum wage fixing meeting would start months in advance, with 
commissioners being encouraged to suggest topics that might be relevant for in-depth 
research and briefing documents. A retreat to discuss these would be held two months 
before the (at least) two-day retreat that tried to reach a decision.  
 
There were five major retreats primarily dedicated to determining the level of the 
wage, most for two years ahead. For each of them the Commission and its staff were 
in exclusive occupancy of one of several of small country hotels. After an opening 
briefing with the most up-to-date economic data, the discussion of the future rate 
would commence. Each time the union and employer ‘sides’ polarised, adopting 
initial positions that were respectively above and below the final agreement point. 
Within these, individual commissioners generally argued for different positions in the 
early stages of discussions. Table 2 provides some details. It indicates the range of the 
initial ‘bids’, and the number of ‘rounds’ of bids, for which commissioners would 
meet in plenary session to indicate movements from their previous positions. It also 
indicates the number of hours over which meetings took place, from first bids to 
agreement, either as plenaries or as parallel sessions in adjournments. All negotiations 
went through three or more rounds, spread over a day or more. In between, the Chair 
would act as an active conciliator, seeing commissioners either individually or as one 
of a ‘side’, often using the two independents in various ways to encourage 
convergence. Perhaps the main points to be drawn from Table 2 are that the 
negotiations involved a lot of talking, that the parties converged slowly, and that the 
process did not get easier with experience. 
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Table 2 –  Range of ‘bids’, number of rounds, and duration of main minimum 
wage rate fixing negotiations of the Low Pay Commission 
 
 Highest minus 
lowest  initial 
bids as % of 
agreed rate 
Number of 
plenary rounds 
with fresh bids  
Hours of 
meetings 
before 
agreement 
1998    10      4     20 
2001      9      4       9 
2003    14      7     15 
2005      9      3       9 
2007      6      4     14 
 
 
Although the three Chairs of the Commission in its first decade had quite different 
characters and different experience of labour negotiations, the role they played was 
much the same. They listened, made suggestions, floated compromises, and 
persuaded. Some of their suggestions loosened log-jams, such as to have a two-phase 
settlement, or to have a statement of future intent, or to break from having the 
minimum wage in multiples of 5p. What changed more was the role of the two 
independents, which shifted to some extent from being on a par with other 
commissioners in terms of their ‘bids’, to more actively supporting the Chair in 
pursuit of agreement. Usually the Chair gave them advance notice that he would start 
by inviting them each to make and justify their initial ‘bids’, as a way of grounding 
subsequent discussion. The independents were aware from the start that their role 
required both the expert analysis of economic data and the facilitation of agreement. 
They dealt with these, in some ways conflicting, objectives differently. In each 
negotiation they entered the discussions independent of the other and usually with 
slightly different bids, one of them usually supporting his with a short analytic note. 
Neither took a consistently ‘harder line’ than the other; there was no pattern as to who 
of them pitched their initial bid higher. 
 
The fact that the independents had full ‘votes’ was of considerable importance in 
achieving agreement. This was because the whole Commission placed great 
importance on achieving unanimity. They all felt that the integrity of the minimum 
wage would be seriously damaged if, in the light of divided advice, the government 
had to choose its own level of minimum wage. Initially this paramount desire to get 
agreement was sufficient, albeit after considerable time and anxiety. Once the 
 13
minimum wage had settled in, however, and the uncertainties about its impact had 
diminished, the independents and the Chair sometimes found it useful to act in a more 
concerted way during the course of the long negotiation sessions. On one occasion the 
three of them used the threat to write a minority report to make progress. On two 
other occasions the independents, in agreement with the Chair, put pressure on one of 
the ‘sides’ by saying that, if its position did not move, they were minded to back the 
other side and thereby open the possibility of a majority report. The implications of 
being left authoring a minority report, which the government would probably reject, 
were not attractive. These tactics facilitated the necessary compromises. With the 
support of the independents, the Chair’s mediatory role was potentially enhanced by, 
in effect, two casting votes. The result was that the process became at times 
comparable with ‘final offer’ arbitration, except that it led, not to an arbitrator’s 
award, but to the two sides reconciling their differences in unanimity. A mediation 
mechanism was, in effect, embedded in the Commission’s structure. 
 
Changes over time 
Despite a superficial similarity of process, the character and complexity of different 
year’s bargains varied substantially. The early years were difficult partly because 
there was considerable uncertainty about institutions, facts, and outcomes. For 
example, until the eve of the first negotiation it was not clear whether the Commission 
would be wound up after its first report, which had considerable implications for the 
degree of caution with which it could embark on setting the initial minimum wage. It 
was known that the available statistical survey data on the low paid were poor, and 
they subsequently turned out to be considerably poorer than anyone thought at the 
time. Above all, there was no empirical basis for assessing what the employment 
consequences might be of introducing the minimum wage any given level. This 
uncertainty is reflected in the early movements in the minimum wage that are shown, 
along with average earnings and price movements, in Figure 1. For the first two years 
it barely kept up with price inflation. 
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Figure 1 - Growth in Adult NMW Compared with Average Wages and Price 
Inflation, 1999-2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: LPC estimates based on ONS data, AEI including bonuses (ONS code LNMQ), RPIX (ONS code CHMK), RPI (ONS 
code CHAW) and CPI (ONS code D7BT), monthly, seasonally adjusted (not seasonally adjusted for RPIX, RPI and CPI), GB 
(UK for RPIX, RPI AND CPI), 1999-2007 
 
 
The middle years were easier, with improved understanding of the data and of their 
short-comings, and solid research indicating no evidence of any adverse 
consequences. The commissioners in 2003 felt confident enough to spell out their 
own, revealed terms of reference as: ‘Our aim is to have a minimum wage that helps 
as many low-paid people as possible without any significant adverse impact on the 
economy.’ They went on to add, using painstakingly negotiated wording, a passage 
that started: ‘We therefore believe there is a strong case for a significant step up in the 
level over the next few years, contingent on economic circumstances’. They 
elaborated this with the words ‘We therefore believe that there is a case for increasing 
the effective level of the minimum wage, implying a series of increases for a number 
of years above average earnings, and increasing gradually the number of people 
benefiting.’ (Low Pay Commission, 2003:173). 
 
Two years later, in 2005, the Commission’s stated aim had been refined to ‘have a 
minimum wage that helps as many low-paid employees as possible without any 
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significant adverse impacts on inflation or employment’. Having noted that none were 
evident thus far, they went on; ‘This suggests that, notwithstanding the significant real 
increase over the past two years, there is scope for a further increase in the effective 
level of the minimum wage over the next two years’ (Low Pay Commission, 2005: 
181). It is evident from Figure 1 that the minimum wage rose faster than average 
earnings from 2003 until 2006. Coverage of the minimum wage was deliberately if 
cautiously increased for four years in a row.  
 
From 2006, reaching agreement in the Commission became much tougher. There was 
still no significant evidence of job loss, but fresh uncertainty arose because recent 
forecasts of average earnings growth had proved to be overstatements. In addition, 
large-scale post-May 2004 immigration from the EU accession states was bringing 
confusing changes to the bottom end of the labour market on which little evidence 
was available. And, as the minimum wage had continued to creep up the income 
distribution, increasingly there were large employers who claimed to be troubled by 
the compression of their internal pay differentials.  
 
Early in 2006 there was a deadlock over confirming the minimum wage that a year 
earlier had been provisionally recommended for the following October. Eventually 
the Commission agreed to go ahead with it, but with a carefully worded statement: 
‘However, we do now consider that the phase in which the Commission is committed 
to increases in the minimum wage above average earnings growth is complete and, 
looking forward, we have no presumption that further increases above average 
earnings are required’ (Low Pay Commission, 2006: 44). In the light of this, and of 
increasing economic uncertainty, the 2007 negotiation was unavoidably hard going. 
One challenge for the commissioners was how far they should take into account the 
over-optimistic forecasts of earnings growth that had arguably influenced previous 
negotiations. An important aspect of a bargaining relationship is inter-temporal; the 
parties need to take account of baggage from the past. Reluctance of the ‘side’ whose 
arguments had benefited from the incorrect forecasts of one year to make due 
concessions in their arguments of the following year, put the bargaining relationship 
under strain. Eventually the Commission ‘came to the conclusion that the present 
situation requires a more cautious approach than in recent years’ and recommended an 
increase in the minimum wage ‘that is less than the predicted increase in average 
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earnings’ (Low Pay Commission, 2007: 240). No attempt was made at a 
recommendation for the following year, when economic circumstances were seen to 
be becoming more challenging. 
 
Social partnership 
What does this imply for social partnership? So far this account has discussed how the 
Low Pay Commission managed the three challenges of maintaining independence of 
government, of getting its recommendations accepted by government, and of 
achieving consensus among its commissioners. After ten years the Commission had 
experienced relatively little public criticism and the minimum wage it managed was 
generally considered a success. Was this a success for social partnership? 
 
At the level of the European Union, social partnership is generally understood as the 
means whereby employer and trade union interests are involved in decision-making 
on labour-related issues. UNICE and ETUC represent the social partners and 
orchestrate the ‘social dialogue’ through which national employer and union 
confederations help to shape national legislation in line with EU directives on matters 
such as parental leave, part-time workers’ rights, and fixed-term contracts. At the 
level of Britain, the notion is less clear. In the early days of New Labour after 1997, 
much was made of the involvement of the TUC and CBI as social partners. They were 
central, for example, to the negotiation of the contents of the 1999 Employment 
Relations Act with its provisions, inter alia, for statutory trade union recognition. The 
role of Acas, on the Council of which they played key roles, was enhanced. It proved 
tougher to get agreed social partnership solutions on some other issues, such as 
intermediate skills training and family-friendly policies. But the Commission has been 
generally considered to be a successful form of social partnership. What does it 
amount to? 
 
Social partnership is a misleading phrase. It carries a burden of unspoken assumptions 
of the ‘motherhood’ variety: that one cannot but be in favour of it and that it 
transcends conflict. It is thereby in danger of being associated with the implication 
that the social partners share a unitary view in a power-free relationship. This is 
definitely not, it should be added, the position of serious analyses of social partnership 
in other countries, which dismiss a unitary, non-confrontational view (see, for 
 17
example, Visser, 2001: 232; Roche, 2007). Certainly the present discussion should 
have dispelled any such characterisation of the working of the Low Pay Commission. 
It is true that on many issues the Commission proved to be a good problem-solver, 
drawing on the diverse experience and knowledge of the commissioners in a 
genuinely unpolarised and non-partisan way. But on the central issue of the level of 
the minimum wage, the Commission was self-consciously polarised. It negotiated 
increases in a pluralist way, sensitive to the shifting power relations in the product and 
labour markets in which the payers and the beneficiaries of the minimum wage 
worked. The consensus around increases in the minimum wage did not emerge simply 
from discussions of sweet reason. It was hammered out through extended negotiation 
– albeit carefully orchestrated, well informed, and largely good-humoured 
negotiation. 
 
This prompts the question of who were the negotiators. Those representing the social 
partners on the Commission did not have a clear relationship with regard to either the 
beneficiaries of the minimum wage or to those who have to pay it. Commissioners do 
not represent them. Their role was to be sympathetic not only to those directly 
affected, but also those indirectly affected by the minimum wage insofar as it affects 
prices, employment, and other aspects that impact upon the wider society. They, and 
the Chair, were selected by a publicly advertised but politically influenced ‘Nolan’ 
procedure in which senior officials of both the CBI and TUC were centrally involved. 
It was designed to get a Commission that broadly combined relevant experience and 
expert knowledge with a balance of regional, industrial and gender interests, as well 
as including a senior official from both the TUC and CBI. In terms of their 
professional self-interest, the position of the commissioners was not simple. 
 
For those commissioners with a trade union background, very few of their members 
were likely to benefit directly from increases in the minimum wage. Most members 
would be on collective agreements paying significantly higher. There was a potential 
conflict of interest, in that the higher the minimum wage was pushed relative to 
average earnings, the smaller would be the benefit of union membership (the union 
‘mark-up’) that might encourage recruitment. In the early days of the Commission 
there were some signs that this consideration might have had a slight influence. But 
there was a strong counter-argument. Private sector unions benefit because a 
 18
minimum wage limits the extent to which non-union firms can undermine collective 
bargaining by using low wages to compete in the same product markets. The 
minimum wage provides a solid floor on which collective bargaining can build. 
Public sector unions have an interest in a relatively high minimum wage insofar as 
they are vulnerable to the outsourcing of some of their members’ jobs to non-union 
firms. What was notable was that, even though their members might not be direct 
beneficiaries, the commissioners from a trade union background, with its strong 
egalitarian ethos, provided unwavering upward pressure on the minimum wage. To 
use Allan Flanders’ distinction, in their role as commissioners, the ‘sword of justice’ 
face of trade unionism eclipsed that of ‘vested interest’ (Flanders, 1970:15). 
 
The position of those from an employer background was different. At least one was 
selected to have some sort of small firm background, and thereby was potentially 
directly affected by the minimum wage. Employer commissioners from a large 
enterprise background tended to be from firms paying well above the minimum wage; 
a higher minimum wage might be expected to enhance their firm’s competitive 
position. Despite these possibly ambivalent interests, employer commissioners were, 
at first sight, consistent in the downward direction of their influence on the minimum 
wage. But that is misleading. It would be more accurate to describe their influence as 
one of restraint on the union commissioners. After its initial settling in, the growth of 
the minimum wage relative to average earnings reflected the fact that the employer 
commissioners, no less than their union counterparts, were committed to achieve the 
highest coverage of workers by the minimum wage that was consistent with the 
protection of employment. 
 
What social partnership amounts to, in the context of the Low Pay Commission, is 
very much a process, and one that transcends the individuals who serve as 
commissioners. The diversity of their backgrounds has made them an effective panel 
for digesting the data, the research, and the consultation necessary to implement and 
maintain a functioning minimum wage that is responsive to a changing economic 
environment. But they have also been sufficiently balanced in sympathies to the low 
payers on the one hand and the low paid on the other. This has enabled them to 
negotiate, with embedded mediation, a level of minimum wage that has been not only 
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acceptable to government but also, at time of writing, overwhelmingly benign in its 
economic and social impact. 
 
The author is grateful for the comments of David Metcalf, George Bain, Colm 
McLaughlin, and Andrew Gamble and the assistance of the staff of the Low Pay 
Commission, none of whom are responsible for any judgements or errors in this 
paper. 
 20
 
 
References 
 
Brown, W. A. (2000), ‘Putting partnership into practice in Britain’, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 38:2, 299-316.  
 
Brown, W. A. (2002), ‘The operation of the Low Pay Commission’, Employee 
Relations, 24:6, December, 595-605. 
 
Brown, W. A. (2006), ‘The Low Pay Commission’, in Dickens, L. and Neal, A. C. 
(eds), The Changing Institutional Face of British Employment Relations, Alphen aan 
den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 63 – 78. 
 
Flanders, A. (1970), Management and Unions: the Theory and Reform of Industrial 
Relations, London: Faber and Faber. 
 
Low Pay Commission (2003), Fourth Report of the Low Pay Commission, Norwich: 
TSO. 
 
Low Pay Commission (2005), National Minimum Wage: Low Pay Commission 
Report 2005, Norwich: TSO. 
 
Low Pay Commission (2006), National Minimum Wage: Low Pay Commission 
Report 2006, Norwich: TSO. 
 
Low Pay Commission (2007), National Minimum Wage: Low Pay Commission 
Report 2007, Norwich: TSO. 
 
Metcalf, D. (1999), ‘The Low Pay Commission and the National Minimum Wage’, 
Economic Journal, 109 (453), 46 – 66 
 
Metcalf, D. (2008), ‘Why has the British National Minimum Wage had little or no 
impact on employment’, The Journal of Industrial Relations, 50(3), 489-511. 
 21
 
Roche, W. K. (2007), ‘Social partnership in Ireland and new social pacts’, Industrial 
Relations, 46(3), 395 – 425 
 
Visser, J.  (2001), chapter in Auer, P. (ed.), Changing Labour Markets in Europe: the 
Role of Institutions and Policies, Geneva: International Labour Organisation 
